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INTRODUCTION 
In the months surrounding Justice John Paul Stevens's announcement of his 
intention to retire from the Supreme Court, public discussions about the import 
of his departure regularly noted his significance on the current Court as the last 
remaining military service veteran of World War 11. 1 Indeed, talcing the Justice's 
landmark post-September 11 opinions standing alone, it was not difficult to 
speculate that the Justice's personal knowledge and experience of wartime 
executives past informed his decisions in cases such as Rasul v. Bush (establish-
ing federal court jurisdiction over the claims of the Guantanamo Bay detain-
ees), 2 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (holding the Executive without statutory authority 
to establish military commission trials at Guantanamo Bay).3 Perhaps the 
perceived failures of the World War II-era Court to check executive initiatives in 
wartime contributed to the Justice's rejection of the contemporary Executive's 
calls for broad deference from the Court sixty years after Korematsu.4 
* Associate Research Scholar, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Prince-
ton University; Visiting Faculty Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Clerk to Justice John 
Paul Stevens, 1999-2000. © 2011, Deborah Pearlstein. The ideas developed in this Essay are based on 
remarks the author first presented at a symposium sponsored by the University of California at Davis 
Law Review on March 6, 2009, and published in Deborah N. Pearlstein, A Measure of Deference: 
Justice Stevens from Chevron to Hamdan, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1063 (2010). 
l. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justice Stevens to Retire from Supreme Court, USA TODAY, Apr. 12, 
20 I 0, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/20 I 0-04-09-justice-stevens-retire_N .htm (not-
ing that Stevens was the "last World War II veteran on the [C]ourt"). 
2. 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004). 
3. 548 U.S. 557, 593-94 (2006). 
4. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the conviction of a U.S. citizen for 
violating an order excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry in defined geographic areas did not violate 
the Constitution); see Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at 
1301 
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Yet Justice Stevens's opinions in the national-security cases represent only a 
small fraction of the decisions in which the Justice was required to evaluate the 
relevance and persuasiveness of the Executive's interpretation of law. Of argu-
ably even greater significance in this respect is the Justice's opinion for the 
Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the 
watershed administrative law decision typically understood to have cemented a 
requirement of judicial deference to Executive Branch interpretations of other-
wise ambiguous statutes.5 Chevron was broadly seen as "revolutionary" in 
identifying the Executive's expertise and superior .political accountability-as 
well as the Court's correspondingly limited credentials in that realm-and in 
citing that functional strength as a central basis for deferring to ·an agency 
interpretation of a statute.6 
Coming from the Chevron Justice, then, Hamdan might be thought a particu-
lar puzzle. Rejecting the Executive's arguments that existing federal statutes 
should be interpreted as authorization for the President's military commissions, 
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court shows no evident deference to the 
President's interpretation of the law. Were not those same functional advantages 
of the Executive-superior accountability and expertise-just as much at work 
in the security cases, marked if anything by their lack of •deference to the 
Executive? How can one square Chevron on one hand, with Hamdan on the 
other, in understanding Justice Stevens's appreciation for Executive Branch 
interpretation of law? This Essay explores a set of potential answers to that 
question. Although several factors may be relevant in explaining the seemingly 
varied approaches-including both a broad misunderstanding of Chevron's 
meaning in the first instance and a concern for constraining the wartime 
Executive in particular-this Essay suggests that the decisions are best seen as 
of a piece in reflecting the Justice's commitment to respecting the Executive's 
functional strengths. As his opinions reveal, Justice Stevens understands these 
strengths as flowing not from the Executive's formal power per se, but·from the 
reasons why the Executive's views of the law may matter. 
War, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 99 (2006) (analy,zing the influence of the opinions of Justice Rutledge (for 
whom Justice Stevens clerked) upon modem executive detention decisions). 
5. 467 U.S. 837, 866-67 (1984). 
6. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1085-87 (2008) ("Almost immediately, Reagan Administration officials and appointees proclaimed a 
'Chevron Revolution." ' ); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive 's Power To Say What the 
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2595-96 (2006) (suggesting that Chevron is a modem-era McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 976 (1992) ("Justice Stevens'[s] opinion contained several 
features that can only be described as 'revolutionary,' even if no revolution was intended at the time." 
(citation omitted)); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 
284 (1986) (''The Chevron decision was both evolutionary and revolutionary."). 
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I. CHEVRON AND HAMDAN 
Said to be the most-cited Supreme Court case in "modem public law,"7 
Chevron famously established a two-step inquiry for courts to follow in ascertain-
ing how to take executive views into account when reviewing agency interpreta-
tions of statutory authority. 8 Where the Court finds statutory meaning clear 
using standard tools of statutory interpretation in the first instance (text, context, 
legislative history, etc.), it need not consult executive views.9 But where the 
meaning of the statute is ambiguous, the Court must cease its usual exercise in 
determining the law's import and inquire only whether the executive agency's 
interpretation is a "permissible" construction of the statute. 10 If the Executive's 
view is reasonable, no further judicial inquiry into the meaning of the law is 
necessary. 11 
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in Chevron explained why such 
deference was a sensible approach: "While agencies are not directly account-
able to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices" in interpreting 
ambiguous statutes. 12 Statutory interpretation was, at least at the ambiguous 
margins, a task that demanded policy judgments best carried out by one of the 
political branches. It would thus be assumed that an ambiguous statute was 
Congress's implicit attempt to leave some interpretive power with the executive 
agency. 13 At the same time, Chevron acknowledged a second reason for defer-
ence that the Court had long recognized: executive agency views may help 
inform statutory meaning when a given situation "depend[s] upon more than 
ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations." 14 
Not only because the President is elected and the Court is not, but also because 
the President's agents may have specialized knowledge in a complex field, the 
Executive's views on the meaning of the law are worth careful consideration. 
Yet despite the apparent salience of those interests, twenty-two years later 
when the Court turned to assess the Executive's claim of statutory authority to 
conduct military commission trials in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, neither Chevron nor 
its reasoning made an appearance in Justice Stevens's Hamdan opinion. 15 
There, the President had argued that both the statutory Au_thorization for Use of 
7. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 823 (2006). 
8. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 
1193 (2007) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). 
9. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
10. Id. at 843. 
1 l. See id. at 844. 
12. Id. at 865--06 (explaining further that "federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty 
to respect legitimate policy choices made by tho$e who do"). · 
13. Id. at 843-44. 
14. Id. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)); see also Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 865 ("Judges are not experts in the field .... "). 
15. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566----635 (2006). 
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Military Force (AUMF) and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
should be read to extend the executive authority to try then-Guantanamo 
detainee Salim Hamdan by military commi.ssion. 16 The President argued that 
the use of military commissions was a "necessary" part of'the "necessary and 
appropriate force" the AUMF authorized the President to use, and "courts are 
not competent to second-guess judgments of the political branches regarding the 
extent of force necessary to prosecute a war." 17 In addition, Article 36 of the 
UCMJ squarely authorized the President to establish procedures "for cases 
arising under this chapter triable in ... military commissions." 18 Under that 
provision, the President was delegated broad authority to establish the rules for 
commission proceedings, including rules different from those ordinarily applied 
in criminal cases, whenever the President "considers" application of those rules 
to be not "practicable."19 By the terms of the statute itself, deference was due 
the President's judgment on what counts as "practicable" or not. And the 
President had made just such a finding in his executive order providing that "the 
danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international 
terrorism" made standard criminal trials impracticable. 20 
Particularly with the UCMJ, one might have imagined that at least Chevron 
deference would apply. The President had seemingly been delegated the power 
to make rules "with the force of law,"21 and the President's competence in 
military affairs in particular had on occasion led the Court to recognize that his 
views had singular import.22 Yet Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court men-
tioned neither Curtiss-Wright nor Chevron and rejected the government's argu-
ments for its own, wholly independent analysis of the statute.23 Whether or not 
the parties to the case thought to cite Chevron, 24 it might not have seemed 
especially surprising for the Chevron Justice to invoke Chevron-like deference. 
16. Brief for Respondents at 7, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 
460875, at *7. 
17. Id. at 16-17, 19-20 (citing The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 
670 (1862) (the President "must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.")). 
18. Id. at 18 (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006)). 
19. Id. at 43-44 (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006)). 
20. Id. at 47 n.22 (quoting Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. § 918 (2002)). 
21. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (clarifying the scope of Chevron 
deference to require a delegation of power by Congress with authority to make regulations "with the 
force oflaw"). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this vast 
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has 
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."). 
23. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575-76 (2006); see also id. at 630 (describing the 
President's interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as "erroneous"). 
24. See Brief for Peti.tioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 
05-184), 2006 WL 53988 (lacking a citation to Chevron); Brief for Respondents, supra note 16 (same); 
see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047, 2084 n.150 (2005) (urging the importation of Chevron-style 
deference into foreign relations law). 
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So why the silence? 
II. THE CHEVRON EXPLANATION 
One piece of the answer seems likely to tum on the relative weakness of 
Chevron itself. In doctrinal terms, Chevron arguably has not mattered much to 
the Supreme Court. As one empirical study concluded, of the thousand-plus 
cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations that the Court decided between 
1984 and 2005, the Court applied Chevron in a scant 8.3%.25 For Justice 
Stevens in particular, it is possible to tell a qualitative story that sees the Justice 
attempting to pull back on the "revolutionary" reading of Chevron over a period · 
of years, beginning almost immediately after the case was decided. In Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, for example, Justice Ste-
vens wrote for the Court in rejecting a statutory interpretation offered by the 
federal Board of Immigration Appeals.26 In an opinion emphasizing the extent 
to which the Court retains interpretive primacy in matters of interpretation, 
Stevens made clear the potential frequency with which the Court could deter-
mine the meaning of administrative statutes without reference to executive 
views: 
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and 
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressio-
nal intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that 
intention is the law and must be given effect.27 
If, as in Cardoza-Fonseca, the statute's text and ordinary canons of construction 
persuade the Court that the statute is clear, the agency's view of matters is 
irrelevant. 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in Cardoza-Fonseca, but disagreed 
with Stevens's reasoning, insisting instead that the Court's purported clarifica-
. tion was in fact an "evisceration" of Chevron.28 Justice Scalia was hardly alone 
in the assessment of the case as challenging the central deference principle of 
25 . See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 6, at 1121. In the vast majority of the 1,014 cases the Court 
decided during this period in which an executive agency interpretation of a statute was at issue, the 
Court applied either a less stringent degree of deference than that afforded by Chevron, or no apparent 
deference at all. Id. 
26. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
27. Id. at 447--48 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 n.9 (1984) (citations omitted)). 
28. Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that if the Court were able to ignore 
an agency's statutory interpretation anytime the Court thinks it can glean the meaning of the statute on 
its own, Chevron is no more than a "doctrine of desperation"). 
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Chevron. 29 Indeed, as the Court has moved in the decades since Chevron to 
limit the range of agency decisions to which Chevron might apply altogether, 
Justice Stevens has regularly rejected the notion that the attention due the 
Executive's views on questions of interpretation was an entitlement that emerged 
from or was even much transformed by Chevron. 30 As he emphasized in his 
2009 opinion in Negusie v. Holder, "deference to agencies' views on statutes 
they administer was not born in [Chevron], nor did the 'singularly judicial role 
of marking the boundaries of agency choice' die with that case."31 By the time 
Chevron came down in 1984, the Court had long since been engaged in the 
dilemma of how to treat executive-agency interpretations of federal statutes. In 
this effort, the Court had long recognized-as it reiterated in Chevron-that 
executive-agency views could help give a "full understanding of the force of the 
statutory policy" when a given situation could be usefully informed by particu-
lar kinds of expert or professional knowledge.32 Yet, as Chevron itself insisted, 
"[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and 
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressio-
nal intent."33 Judges were to retain significant independent authority to deter-
mine whether a statute is clear or ambiguous-often the end of an interpretive 
inquiry-and to determine whether an agency's interpretation is "reasonable"-
also a seemingly broad retention of power. 34 
It would be impossible to read Justice Stevens's opinions in Chevron and its 
progeny and conclude that the Justice entirely discounted the Executive's 
functional advantages over the Court in certain respects. The Executive may 
have had relevant expertise that the Court lacked that could elucidate statutory 
meaning. By dint ·of his electoral accountability, the Executive also enjoyed 
29. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2604 ("Taken on its face, Cardoza-Fonseca seems to be an 
effort to restore the pre-Chevron status quo by asserting the primacy of the judiciary on purely legal 
questions."). 
30. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528, 533-35 (2007) (declining to apply Chevron 
deference to an agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking, reviewing the agency action instead to 
determine whether it was ''.arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006)); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 
(2001) (clarifying, in a majority opinion joined by Justice Stevens, that Chevron deference applies only 
where there has been a delegation of power by Congress with authority to make regulations "with the 
force of law"). 
31. 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170-71 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); 
see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to adminis-
ter .... "). 
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)); see also 
id. at 865 ("Judges are not experts in the field .... "). 
33. Id. at 843 n.9. 
34. See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and 
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1239, 1337 
(2002) (arguing that "judges, and not just administrators, have significant leeway in interpretation and 
that judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes entails more than mere fidelity to legislative 
instructions"). 
I 
I 
I 
_{ 
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policy discretion that the Court did not, and where statutes seemed to leave 
room for the exercise of that particular kind of discretion, it was appropriate that 
the Court defer. But where the statute was understandable to the Court by 
reference to ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, where executive expertise 
was not in evidence, or where gaps left in statutory meaning opened questions 
not of policy, but of fact or law, Justice Stevens saw Chevron as no obstacle to 
independent judicial interpretation. 
ill. THE WARTIME EXPLANATION 
However true the foregoing Chevron account may be, it seems an insufficient 
explanation for the marked rejection in Hamdan of the President's views. 
Whether or not Congress meant to leave the President policy discretion in 
issuing rules for the operation of military commissions under the UCMJ, the 
President's claim to special expertise in military justice matters could not be 
rejected out of hand. The President is Commander in Chief of the nation's 
armed forces, possessing an important formal claim to constitutional authority 
over their conduct. If the Court were serious about deferring to the Executive's 
law interpretation anywhere, surely it would be here. 
It thus seems possible to imagine that Justice Stevens understood the UCMJ 
question at issue in Hamdan to fall into an altogether different category than the 
Clean Air Act question in Chevron. Hamdan appeared as a wartime case with 
significant historical implications, involving essentially the same issue of the 
legality of military commission trials that the Court had repeatedly encountered 
during World War II. Indeed, Justice Stevens came to the Court immediately 
after the war as a clerk to Justice Wiley Rutledge, who himself had struggled 
with the same questions of executive power, individual rights, and national 
security that the Court has faced repeatedly since the attacks of September 11, 
2001.35 Before Stevens's arrival, Rutledge had voted to uphold a military 
curfew on Japanese-Americans living in certain "military areas" in California,36 
and to allow the exclusion of these citizens from these zones,37 insisting that the 
Court defer to the Executive's judgment in such critical times.38 
Yet following this initial pattern of deference, Rutledge seemed later to regret 
these decisions, having described the curfew decision at the time as giving him 
greater "anguish" than any case he had decided, "save possibly one death case" 
he decided while on the court of appeals.39 By the time Justice Rutledge faced 
the question of the legality of the military trial . of a Japanese general after the 
war in In re Yamashita, the year before his clerk, John Stevens, took up work at 
35. See Green, supra note 4, at 113-75. 
36. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 86, 104--05 (1943). 
37. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-20 (1944). . 
38. See JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE Cm.nu: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY 
RUTI..EDGE 243-45, 255-57 (2004). 
39. Id. at 245; see also Green, supra note 4, at 139 & n.174. 
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the Court, Rutledge was writing in vigorous dissent: 
[A]lthough without doubt the directive [creating the military commission 
rules] was drawn in good faith in the belief that it would expedite the trial and 
that enemy belligerents in petitioner's position were not entitled to more, that 
state of mind and purpose cannot cure the nullification of basic constitutional 
standards which has taken place . 
. . . The difference between the Court's view of this proceeding and my own 
comes down in the end to the view, on the one hand, that there is no law 
restrictive upon these proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations 
may be prescribed for their government by the executive authority or the 
military and, on the other hand, that the provisions of the Articles of War, of 
the Geneva Convention and the Fifth Amendment apply. 
I cannot accept the view that anywhere in our system resides or lurks a power 
so unrestrained to deal with any human being through any process of trial.40 
Exigencies could arise, but particularly where the government response imposes 
a burden on individual rights, it was within the power of the courts to check the 
reasons for the response, in security matters as anywhere else. 
In this context, one might be more inclined to see Justice Stevens's decision 
in Hamdan as an effort to put into practice the lessons learned by his former 
boss in an earlier war. Indeed, the opinion in Hamdan more than once invokes 
Rutledge's dissent.41 Writing for the majority two years before Hamdan in 
Rasul v. Bush, Justice Stevens had made clear his suspicion that the broad 
detention program at Guantanamo ran afoul of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.42 Congress had already tried once to strip the Court of jurisdic-
tion over the habeas claims of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, in a provision 
the Hamdan Court concluded was not effective in stripping those rights before 
reaching the question of the commissions' legality.43 It was unclear in 2006 how 
many more opportunities the Court would have to engage the merits of the 
Executive's initiatives at Guantanamo Bay. The least Rutledge's former clerk 
could do was demonstrate that the modem Court would not make the same 
mistake of unquestioned deference to the Executive's views that an earlier 
wartime-era Court had done. 
IV. THE FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION 
The extent to which Justice Rutledge's wartime experiences on the Court 
influenced Justice Stevens's approach to the wartime Executive may well be 
ultimately undiscoverable. Justices themselves may not have conscious access 
40. 327 U.S. l, 81 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
41. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,618, 632 (2006). 
42. 542 U.S. 466,483 n.15 (2004). 
43. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572-84 (holding that the Detainee Treatment Act had not successfully 
deprived the Court of jurisdiction over Hamdan's case). 
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to how all their lifetime influences lead them to decide as they do. In all events, 
a less biographically contingent explanation seems apparent: namely, that Jus-
tice Stevens believes the Executive's views are relevant-in any context--only 
insofar as they reflect the actual and reasoned consideration of functional 
expertise evident on the record. Stevens's post-Chevron decisions have thus 
chafed against the categorical demand for deference reflected in the revolution-
ary view of Chevron-a view that would arguably allow the Court to defer to 
agency views whether or not the opinions of the actual experts inside the agency 
were consulted. 
Consider, for example, Justice Stevens's 2007 opinion for the Court in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which declined to afford the EPA Chevron deference in 
its decision not to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions.44 The Court acknowl-
edged that it had "neither the expertise nor the authority to evaluate" whether to 
regulate greenhouse gases.45 Nonetheless, the majority opinion engaged the 
agency's explanation point by point and concluded that although the agency 
certainly had expert knowledge it could bring to bear in rendering its decision, 
the agency had in fact relied on considerations well beyond its field of exper-
tise.46 Among the EPA's arguments was the position "that regulating greenhouse 
gases might impair the President's ability to negotiate with 'key developing 
nations' to reduce emissions."47 Yet Congress had authorized the State Depart-
ment rather than the EPA "to formulate United States foreign policy with 
reference to environmental matters relating to climate."48 Here, the EPA's 
assertions about the likely impact on international negotiations had been made 
without evidence that they had ever consulted the State Department.49 In this 
respect, the EPA lacked the demonstrable expertise that might lead its views to 
merit deference. 50 
From this perspective, one might better see Hamdan not as a case in which 
the Court showed the President no deference, but rather a case in which the 
Court deferred to the views of the relevant experts inside. the Executive Branch. 
The Executive's briefs in Hamdan argued that the UCMJ delegated broad 
44. 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007). 
45. Id. at 533. 
46. Id. at 533-34 ("Although we have neither the expertise nor the authority to evaluate these policy 
judgments, it is evident they have nothing to do with ... a reasoned justification for declining to form a 
scientific judgment."); see also id. at 535 ("EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the 
statute."). 
47. Id. at 533. 
48. Id. at 534. 
49. Id. 
50. Much the same reasoning is evident in one of Justice Stevens's final opinions involving the State 
Department's understanding of the terms of a treaty. There, Justice Stevens declined to defer to the 
treaty interpretation put forward by the Department of State. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 2008 
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Department offers us little more than its own reading of the 
treaty's text. Its view is informed by no unique vantage it has, whether as the entity responsible for 
enforcing the Convention in this country or as a participating drafter .... I see no reason, therefore, to 
replace our understanding of the Convention's text with that of the Executive Branch."). 
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authority to the President to establish rules for commission proceedings, includ-
ing rules different from those generally recognized in criminal cases, whenever 
the President "considers" application of those ·rules to be not "practicable."51 
The briefs posited that the President had made just such a dispositive finding in 
his executive order providing that "the danger to the safety of the United States 
and the nature of international terrorism" made standard criminal trials impracti-
cable for detainees like Hamdan. 52 -
In the Hamdan Court's view, the President's generalized finding about the 
viability of criminal trials was "insufficient."53 Statutory language requiring 
commission and court martial procedures to be "uniform" to the extent "practi-
cable" did not say that uniformity could be waived whenever the President 
"consider[ ed]" it impracticable. 54 This statutory standard was far more objec-
tive, requiring uniformity "insofar as" practicable.55 Even assuming that the 
President's generalized finding that criminal trials were inadequate was relevant · 
to the impracticability inquiry, and that such a finding "would be entitled to a 
measure of deference"56 under the statute, "the only reason offered in support of 
that determination is the danger posed by international terrorism."57 Although 
the Court emphasized that it did not "for one moment underestimat[ e] that 
danger," it found no specific reason in the record for challenging the notion that 
standard court martial rules would work.58 "There is no suggestion, for ex-
ample, of any logistical difficulty in securing properly sworn and authenticated 
evidence or in applying the usual principles of relevance and admissibility."59 In 
the absence of any such record, dissenting Justice Clarence Thomas cited 
statements made to the media by civilian Defense Department officials to help 
support the case that commissions were necessary.60 But the majority dismissed 
such statements as inadequate: "We have not heretofore, in evaluating the 
legality of executive action, deferred to comments made by such officials to the 
media."61 Expertise in the Executive was not a functional advantage to be 
assumed; it was a virtue executives would have to demonstrate. 
Indeed, far from having a detailed set of reasons from the President why 
special commission rules were necessary to the task, the Hamdan Court had 
51. Brief for Respondents, supra note 16, at 18 (citing Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 836 (2006)). The President also unsuccessfully advanced the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) as a source of congressional authority to establish military commissions. See 'id. at 16-17 
(citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.1Q7-40·, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). 
52. Id. at 43-47 & n.22 (quoting Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. § 918 (2002)). 
53. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,622 (2006). 
54. See id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 836). 
55. See id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 836). 
56. Id. at 623 n.51. 
51. Id. at 623. 
58. Id. at 623-24. 
59. Id. at 623. 
60. Id. at 712-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. at 623 n.52 (majority opinion) (citing id. at 712-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
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before it indications from the military's resident experts in war crimes trials that 
tended to support just the opposite conclusion. The petition for certiorari to the 
Court had cited the leaked internal email messages from several military 
prosecutors who had requested transfers away from their positions as commis-
sion prosecutors after expressing grave concerns that the commissions were not 
only legally flawed but also corrupt.62 The Court likewise had arnicus briefs 
from recently retired admirals and generals arguing that the President was 
wrong in determining that the Geneva Conventions did not apply in the instant 
conflict, and that recent civilian conclusions to the contrary were endangering 
American lives.63 Amici retired officers emphasized the Court's Article III 
power to interpret the treaty law independently and urged the Court to "direct 
the President to afford [Hamdan Geneva Conventions] protections forthwith."64 
And prominent press accounts had reported that the Administration had by-
passed standard internal decision-making processes when it designed the commis-
sions, ensuring that "[m]ilitary lawyers were largely excluded" from the process 
of developing a commission trial system in the days following the September 11 
attacks.65 In a multipart series of articles, the New York Times detailed how 
civilian officials in the Administration had put forward commission rules over 
the objections of senior military leaders, including the Army Judge Advocate 
General, that the rules fell short of domestic and international law standards. 66 
For a Court looking for record assurance that the decision-making process that 
produced the commissions was supported by analysis of the Executive's experts 
themselves, it was possible to find much cause for concern. 
62. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184) ('"[T]he chief 
prosecutor had told his subordinates that the members of the military commission that would try the 
first four defendants [which include Hamdan] would be "handpicked" to ensure that all would be 
convicted."') (quoting Neil A. Lewis, Two Prosecutors Faulted Trials for Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
1, 2005, at Al (describing leaked email messages from military prosecutors complaining about the lack 
of fairness in the military commissions)). 
63. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Retired Generals and Admirals and Milt Bearden in Support of 
Petitioner at 15-24, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184). 
64. Id. at 3. 
65. Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at NL 
66. Id. ("Many of the Pentagon's experts on military justice, uniformed lawyers who had spent their 
careers working on such issues, were mostly kept in the dark . . .. [T]he Army's judge advocate general, 
Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Romig, hurriedly convened a meeting of senior military lawyers to discuss a 
response [to a draft presidential order creating the commissions]. The group worked through the 
Veterans Day weekend to prepare suggestions that would have moved the tribunals closer to existing 
military justice. But when the final document was issued that Tuesday, it reflected none of the officers' 
ideas, several military officials said. 'They hadn't changed a thing,' one official said. In fact, while the 
military lawyers were pulling together their response, they were unaware that senior administration 
officials were already at the White House putting finishing touches on the plan."); see also Trm Golden, 
Administration Officials Split over Stalled Military Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at Al 
(describing divisions over military tribunal rules among senior officials in the Pentagon, the White 
House, the National Security .Council, the State Department, and the Justice Department). 
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CONCLUSION 
The exercise of explaining a jurisprudence that spans more than three decades 
on the bench is invariably difficult. It would be remarkable indeed if a Justice's 
views showed no indication of evolution- during such a period of time. Yet 
Justice Stevens's repeated engagement with the views of the Executive Branch 
seems far more consistent than not. It reflects the judgment that expertise and 
record evidence could be persuasive indeed. Far less valuable was the mere 
assertion of executive authority. 
